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Order in the Court: Judicial Stability
and Democratic Success in Haiti
ABSTRACT

Haiti faces many challenges in its attempt to build a stable,
liberal democracy. Haitians have endured a legacy of chaotic
and heavy-handed rule in recent decades, and the success of
democracy in Haiti is both hoped for and doubted by Haitians
and the internationalcommunity. One reasonfor the doubts has
been the failure of the Haitian government successfully to
implement free and fair elections. Citizens and candidates are
often hesitant even to participatein elections. Though both were
tragic, neither the failed legislative anal presidential elections of
2000, nor the subsequent coup d'etat in 2004 that resulted in the
ouster of President Jean Bertrand-Aristide were particularly
unique in Haiti's history. In order for Haiti to implement
elections in a manner that creates legitimate leaders and an
engaged electorate, the rule of law and the order of the Haitian
Constitutionmust be enforced.
This Note argues that while far from perfect, the Haitian
judiciary has the potential to play the most vital role in the
institutional stabilization and democratization of Haiti. As
judges are not subject to election, Haiti'sjudicial system stands
at an arm's length from the government's suspicious electoral
practices. The judiciary has already achieved a relatively
impressive level of competence as demonstrated in the Raboteau
trail of 2000, and it is the most promising of Haiti's
governmental institutionsto foster the rule of law and electoral
stability. Haiti is in a truly desperate condition and requires
steps toward authentic democratization to put its government
and its people on the road to success. Judicial implementation
and enforcement of a potent and reasonable body of electoral
and constitutional law is a good first step, and the Haitian
judicial system may be able to lead the way to electoral success
in Haiti.
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"For at the real heart of the battle for equality is a deep-seated belief in
the democratic process. Equality depends, not on the force of arms or
tear gas, but depends upon the force of moral right-not on recourse to
violence, but on respect for law and order."
U. S. President Lyndon B. Johnson, 1965.1

1.
President Lyndon B. Johnson, "We Shall Overcome," Address Before the
United States Congress, Washington, D.C. (Mar. 15, 1965), available at
http://www.usembassy.de/usa/etexts/speeches/rhetoric/lbjoerco.htm
(last visited Feb.
12, 2004).
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I. INTRODUCTION

Both the democratization of Haiti and, more specifically, the
enforcement of the existing Haitian Constitution are critical goals for
the country's future and the fate of the larger region. Haiti faces a
startling set of obstacles between its present condition and the stable
democracy envisioned in 1987 when the Haitian Constitution was
composed. While it is hard for a struggling country to set priorities
following a coup d'etat, Haiti, with the help of the international
community, must do so with an emphasis on priorities conducive to
long-term progress. The most basic step in achieving real democracy
is the existence of truly free and fair elections over time. This is
especially true in Haiti where the specter of failed elections is recent
and vivid. While progress on other issues such as health care,
education, environmental rejuvenation, and crime prevention must
not be tossed aside, electoral reform must be an essential priority for
building Haitian democracy.
Support from the international community is essential to build a
democratic and independent Haiti. Help must be given in a manner
that fosters Haiti's eventual independence instead of assuring
perpetual dependence. Haiti's executive and legislative offices are
shrouded in a cloud of illegitimacy because of the questionable
elections and appointments that have filled those offices or even left
them vacant. The international community has been very critical of
Haiti's electoral processes, and Haitians are generally so incensed
and suspicious that opposing parties refuse to participate in elections,
and citizens are wary to vote. Such suspicion of the voting process
encourages dissatisfied Haitians to turn to violence rather than the
ballot box in pursuit of change.
Though it is far from perfect, Haiti's most competent and
legitimate governmental institution is the judicial branch. By
empowering the courts and aiding their growth in both influence and
expertise, the body of Haitian constitutional and electoral law can
mature. Haiti's successful democratization will not be easy, and there
are disagreements concerning the best way to achieve it, but in order
to create a democracy, the government must be legitimately elected
by the country's people. Paradoxically, the unelected, undemocratic
judiciary is in the best position to begin charting Haiti's path toward
electoral stability and, in turn, democratic legitimacy.
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II. THE PROBLEM: HAITI'S DESPERATE CONDITION CREATES INFERTILE
GROUND FOR TRUE AND LASTING DEMOCRACY

A. A Brief Account of Recent History
In 1804, in winning its freedom from French rule, Haiti became
the world's first black republic.2 Despite the fact that it has existed
for two centuries, the recent history of the island country
demonstrates anything but consistency and stability. In 1957,
Franqois Duvalier won Haiti's presidential election and began to take
unfortunate steps to solidify, centralize, and concentrate his power,
morphing his elected presidency into a military dictatorship
buttressed by the support of a privileged elite.3 After Frangois's death
in 1971, his son, Jean-Claude "Baby Doc" Duvalier took over his
father's position as well as his manner of rule, and Haiti's
humanitarian and economic problems worsened. 4 Baby Doc was
ousted by a military coup in 1986, but little changed afterward; it was
''5
just "Duvalierism without Duvalier.
The late 1980s saw the rise of grassroots movements seeking
democracy. Though many powerful segments of Haitian society
opposed it, a 1990 presidential election was held peacefully. JeanBertrand Aristide, a Catholic Priest who had been a voice of the
democratic movement, won the election with sixty-seven percent of
the vote. 6 This election was promising given Haiti's tumultuous and
divided history. 7 One scholar has posited that in Haiti's 200-year
existence, the people have only twice been "of one mind" about
anything: the first time was in winning independence at the
beginning of the nineteenth century, the second time was this election
8
of Aristide.
Once he took office, many accused Aristide of conducting his
presidency more like a dictator than a democratic leader as he
allowed Haiti's rural areas to rule themselves (or be ruled by local

2.

Andrew S. Levin, Civil Society and Democratization in Haiti, 9 EMORY

INT'L L. REV. 389, 413 (1995).
3.
Leslie A. Benton & Glenn T. Ware, Haiti: A Case Study of the International

Response and the Efficacy of Nongovernmental Organizations in the Crisis, 12 EMORY
INT'L L. REV. 851, 857-58 (1998).
4.
Id. at 859.

5.

Id.

6.

Id.at 861.

7.

Irwin P. Stotzky, On the Promise and Perils of Democracy in Haiti, 29 U.

MAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 1, 2 (1998).
8.
Id.
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strong-arms), did not trouble with having parliament confirm his
military appointments, and availed himself of a foreign-trained
personal security service. 9 On September 30, 1991, Aristide fell victim
to a military coup, was deposed, and left the country (he first went to
Venezuela and then to the United States), and a new military regime
took power. 10 Though the Haitian people had managed to make a
successful call for presidential elections, Haiti's weak political system,
due to generations of inexperience and instability, was unable to
support and sustain the democratic revolution, and the military
government held power for three years."
In September 1994, the U.N. Security Council approved a
military operation led by the United States to force the military
government out and restore Aristide to power, but after a last-minute
negotiating success by Jimmy Carter, the military leaders permitted
the peaceful reinstatement of the democratic regime. 12 On October
15, 1994, Aristide returned to power, becoming the only
democratically elected president to replace the very military regime
3
that overthrew him.'
Because the Haitian Constitution forbids two consecutive
presidential terms, 14 Aristide gave way to a hand-picked candidate
from his Lavalas Party, Rene Preval, who won the presidential
election in 1995.15 While in office, Preval dismissed legislators
without providing for new elections, and when elections were finally
held in May of 2000, accusations of corruption, intimidation, and
violence destroyed their legitimacy and incited passionate, longlasting protest. 16 Similarly, in the presidential election held in
November of 2000, in which Aristide was elected to his second term,
the U.S. State Department estimated that less than ten percent of the
eligible electorate participated and that there were a wide variety of
other irregularities. 1 7 Aristide took office for his second term in
February 2001, but because the legislative elections in May 2000 and
the presidential election in November 2000 were widely perceived as

9.
Benton & Ware, supranote 3, at 863-64.
10.
Id. at 864.
Levin, supra note 2, at 441-42.
11.
12.
Brian Concannon, Jr., Beyond Complementarity: The International
Criminal Court and National Prosecutions,A View from Haiti, 32 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L.
REV. 201, 204 (2000); Stotzky, supra note 16, at 3.
13.
Stotzky, supra note 7, at 3.
14.

HAITI CONST. art. 134.

15.
Steve Chapman, Restoring Democracy is Easier Said than Done, CHI. TRIB.,
Dec. 7, 2000, at N29.
16.
Id.
Id.
17.
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illegitimate, the entire government's legitimacy and stability came
18
further into question both domestically and internationally.
Despite the calls for remedial action, the election results were
never addressed by Aristide though he often claimed an intention to
do so, and the parliament limped through a term of criticism until
most of the legislative terms expired in January 2004.19 After
January 2004, anti-Aristide protests continued to spread, particularly
in Haiti's northern regions, as rebels acted against police and elected
officials from city to city. 20 The chaotic rebellion eventually rolled into
the streets of the capital of Port-au-Prince with protesters demanding
21

Aristide's resignation.
Having run out of options and international support, Aristide
and his wife left Haiti aboard a U.S. military aircraft early in the
morning on February 29, 2004.22 After this, Aristide's second
departure, rebels celebrated, but the violence did not stop. Over one
hundred Haitians were killed in the rebellion and reports suggest
that over three hundred have been killed in reprisal after Aristide's
departure. 23 The United States has sent Marines to serve as a
stabilizing force, and the current plan is for those Marines to hand
over their role to a multi-national force under the United Nations on
June 1, 2004.24
The Chief Justice of Haiti's Supreme Court, Boniface Alexandre,
was installed on March 1 to fill the void as interim president. 25 A
U.S.-backed, seven-member council including Alexandre named
former foreign Minister Gerard Latortue to the post of Prime
Minister in the transitional government. 2 6 The legislature remains
27
largely vacant.

18.
See HaitianOpposition Vows New Protests to Force Aristide to Resign, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 28, 2002, at A14 (explaining, 'Mr. Aristide has been hamstrung since he
took office in February 2001.").
19.
DeNeen L. Brown, In Haiti, Two Sides and Bloodshed Between; Political
Crisis Deepens as President's Supporters, Opposition Trade Accusations, WASH. POST,
Feb. 3, 2004, at A13.
20.
Associated Press, Rebels Take Over Haiti'sFourth Largest City, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 6, 2004, 2004 WL 59682389.
21.
Aristide Leaves Haiti Amid Chaos, WALL ST. J., Mar. 1. 2004, at A3.
22.
Peter Slevin & Mike Allen, FormerAlly's Shift in Stance Left Haiti Leader
No Recourse, WASH. POST, Mar. 1, 2004, at Al.
23.
Associated Press, Haiti's Prime Minister Chosen; Move by U.S.-backed
Council is Step Toward Interim Government, WASH. POST, Mar. 10, 2004, at A18.
24 Tom Weiner and Lydia Polgreen, HaitiansAgain Relying on U.S. Military to Bring
Peace, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 7, 2004, at A10.
25.
Kevin Sullivan & Scott Wilson, Aristide Resigns, Flies into Exile; U.S.
Marines to Lead Peacekeeping;Haiti Wracked By New Round of Violence, WASH. POST,
Mar. 1, 2004, at Al.
26.
Associated Press, supra note 23.
27.
Brown, supra note 19.
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B. Haiti'sDesperate Condition
Haiti's problems are as startling in severity as they are in
number. The country's inflation topped fifteen percent in 2000 and
reached thirty percent in the last half of 2002.28 Over sixty percent of
the population is undernourished. 29 Haiti has the highest AIDS rate
in the Caribbean. 30 Haiti is the poorest country in the Western
hemisphere. 31 Haiti has eight million people and fewer than one
thousand doctors. 32 Two-thirds of Haitians are illiterate, and the
country's high schools enroll fewer than five percent of the eligible
students. 33 Added to all of this is the fact that many of those
responsible for the demise and lawlessness of today's Haiti remain in
the country as do some 250,000 automatic weapons hidden or stashed
throughout the country. 34 Stability is anything but certain. Haiti also
35
has a rigid class structure that contributes to these other problems.
Even Haiti's land is in terrible condition: where Haiti was once
twenty percent forest, it now has forestation levels of less than 1.5
percent, and this condition results in constant environmental
destruction caused by erosion. 3 6 With problems such as these, Haiti
proves a challenging case study for the potential success or failure of
37
developing democracy in nations emerging from dictatorial rule.
C. The Absence of the Rule of Law
Perhaps what distinguishes Haiti most from other failed states is
the extent to which even predictable parts of life are unpredictable
there. While visiting Haiti in 1997, a Haitian friend shared a local
proverb with me: "In Haiti, sometimes the sun comes up over here,
sometimes it comes up over there." It is no wonder that due process,
the rule of law, and respect for constitutional principles are
struggling institutions and even low priorities in Haiti because such

28.
The Americas: FrustrationBoils Over, ECONOMIST, Nov 30, 2002, at 50.
29.
Id.
30.
Associated Press, Aristide Poised for Election as Hopes Diminish for Haiti,
Nov. 21, 2000, available at http://www.cnn.com/2000/WORLD/americas/11/21/
haiti.elections.ap/ (last visited Feb. 12, 2004).
31.
Irwin P. Stotzky, Symposium on the Role of a Free Press and Freedom of
Expression in the Development and Consolidation of Democracies in Latin America, 56
U. MIAMI L. REV. 255, 283 (2002).
32.
Id.
33.
Id.
34.
Id. at 286.
35.
Stotzky, supra note 7, at 2.
36.
The Americas, FrustrationBoils Over, supra note 28.
37.
See Stotzky, supra note 31, at 279 (stating that Haiti represents to an
extreme degree the struggles faces by other former dictatorships striving toward
democracy).
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things flourish in stable, predictable societies. 38 Another Haitian
'39
proverb explains all too bluntly: "Law is paper; bayonet is steel.
While the thirty years of Duvalier dictatorship certainly deserves
much of the blame for leaving Haiti in its current sorry condition, the
blame for Haiti's inability to now right itself cannot entirely be placed
on the Aristide government. 40 Though Aristide had many faults as
President, it is not that administration's policies, but the magnitude
of the difficulties inherent in steering such a country through a
democratic transition that create the ultimate burden on Haiti's
progress. 41 An official human rights observer in Haiti throughout the
late 1990s described some of the specific burdens that Haiti must
shoulder: 42 the historic place and operation of Haiti's justice system,
the dominant presence of other high-priority issues, societal
resistance to prosecution, inadequacies in law enforcement, and
general insecurity among the people. 43 It is this set of cultural,
practical, and institutional obstacles that make success of the rule of
law in Haiti so difficult to achieve, no matter how much the
44
government is willing to set policies toward that end.
Haiti's justice system has a multitude of problems: a long history
of sluggishness, under-investment, archaic laws, exclusive jury pools,
and a willingness to cater to the elite.4 5 To the extent that Haitians
desire an opportunity to address past wrongs, the Haitian system
does offer two distinct benefits: no amnesty law and no statute of
limitations. 46 Such a situation could allow Haiti and the international
community to build on the rule of law not only to secure Haiti's
future, but also to reconcile the past with respect to human rights
violations, though moving toward common progress may be more
important to the country.
The predominance of other high-priority issues in Haiti is
47
perhaps the most daunting obstacle to Haiti's democratization.
Haiti's poverty, medical crises, economic struggles, and educational
inadequacy all demand high prioritization in the allocation of Haiti's
very limited resources. 48 Not only can the stability of law enforcement

38.

IRWIN P.

STOTZKY,

SILENCING THE GUNS IN HAITI:

THE PROMISE OF

DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY 208 (1997) (asserting that while the rule of law, due
process, and constitutional stability are vital, they do not yet exist in Haiti).
39.
See Stotzky, supra note 31, at 287.
40.
See Concannon, supra note 12, at 209.
41.
Id.
42.
Id. at 201.
43.
Id. at 209.
44.
Id.
45.
Id. at 210-13.
46.
Id. at 213.
47.
See supra notes 28-37.
48.
See Concannon, supra note 12, at 214-15.

20041

ORDER IN THE COURT

and the courts seem less urgent to many Haitians than these other
issues, some observers feel that high profile, controversial trials can
further damage stabilization efforts due to the passions they can
49
evoke and the unrest they can cause.
Long term social and economic stability depends largely on
governmental and judicial stability. 50 The current instability coupled
with an inadequate and inexperienced law enforcement regime leaves
51
Haiti without the general security required to foster the rule of law.
The predominance of common crime and inadequate incarceration
leaves Haitian judges, prosecutors, and potential jurors worried about
concerns as basic as their own safety. 52 The only conclusion to draw
from the facts is that democratization in Haiti faces a dramatic uphill
fight. 53 Problems such as Haiti's can even be exacerbated in the early
stages of legitimate democratization as the threatened elite may work
against stabilization, thus making the transition even more difficult
and threatening the confidence of some citizens. 54 The ruling elite
which has held so much power in Haiti in recent decades has a motive
to stand in the way as well: a true free market economy, a more likely
path for Haiti under true democracy (as well as an ingredient in
Haiti's democratization in the chicken-egg relationship of democracy
and capitalism), could threaten the control those elites have over
55
Haiti's scarce markets and resources.
To add to the litany of problems disrupting Haitian progress,
drug traffickers have entered the scene. 56 The U.S. report, which is
issued yearly concerning the global drug trade, described Haiti as a
"path of minimal resistance" for drug traffic due to corrupt officials,
inadequate police, and weak democratic institutions. 57 Not only are
the Haitian police forces inadequate, as recently as fall 2002,
observers commented on the free reign enjoyed by armed leaders and

49.
Id. at 215-16.
50.
Id. at n.64.
51.
Id at 223.
52.
Id. at 224.
53.
It has been noted that "[w]hat combination of woes can be overcome [in
creating a democracy] is unknown and probably unknowable. We can readily admit
that for some, achieving stable democracy in the near term is unlikely." Samuel H.
Barnes, The Contribution of Democracy to Rebuilding Postconflict Societies, 95 AM. J.
INT'L L. 86 (2001) (emphasis added). If "for some" stable democracy is not achievable,
perhaps Haiti is one of the "some," given the magnitude of its problems. The hope, of
course, is that Haiti is a hard case and not an impossible one. While Haiti has been
remarkably unstable and inconsistent, it has not been as dramatically violent as many
other nations who are attempting democratization.
54.
See id. at 88.
55.
Ira Kurzban, A Rational Foreign Policy Toward Haiti and How the Media
Shapes Public Perceptionof Haiti, 56 U. MIAMI L. REV. 405, 407-08 (2002).
56.
Id. at 409 (describing the Haitian drug trade as causing "insecurity,
corruption, and [a] threat to true national security"); Haiti's Leader Calls U.S. Drug
Charges Unfounded, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb 6, 2003, at All.
57.
See Haiti'sLeader Calls U.S. Drug Charges Unfounded, supra note 56.
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militiamen in Haiti's rural regions; such figures are prime candidates
for unregulated, corrupt, or illegal arrangements with drug58
traffickers.

III. THE GOAL: A STABLE

DEMOCRACY

The Organization of American States has declared that
representative democracy is an "indispensable condition for the
stability, peace, and development of the region." 59 Creating such a
system will be difficult, and it is not only the trajectory of life in Haiti
that is at stake. 60 Democratic governments contribute to global
stability, and to the extent that such is the case, disruptions of
sovereign democracies threaten that stability. 6 1 Consequently, those
disruptions can hamper not only the stability that a particular state
adds to the global picture, but allowing states to drift away from
democratic success may also threaten the international trend toward
democracy and the safety that flows from that trend. 62 For the United
States, another undesirable result of ineffective democracy in Haiti is
the subsequent increase in Haitians seeking to immigrate to the
United States when conditions in Haiti deteriorate. 63 For instance, on
November 30, 2002, over two hundred Haitian refugees abandoned
their boat and clamored onto a busy causeway near downtown Miami
64
- the largest number of illegal Haitian immigrants in three years.
The current crisis has renewed the flood of Haitian refugees, the U.S.

58.
UN Expert Alarmed By Impunity GrantedArmed Militiasin Haiti, AGENCE
FRANCE PRESSE, Oct. 4, 2002, availableat 2002 WL 23616899.
59.
Karl J. Irving, The United Nations and DemocraticIntervention: Is "Swords
into Ballot Boxes" Enough?, 25 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 41, 48 (1996).
60.
See Elizabeth F. DeFeis, Proceedings of the 2001 Symposium: International
Elections Monitoring: Should Democracy Be a Right?: Elections - A Global Right?, 19
WIS. INT'L L.J. 321, 321 (2001) (asserting that "democratic government.. implies a lot
more than participation in the political process or periodic and free elections. In
addition to self-governance, democracy implies at least respect for human rights, the
rule of law and an independent functioning judiciary.").
61.
Douglas Lee Donoho, Evolution or Expediency: The United Nations
Response to the Disruption of Democracy, 29 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 329, 364-65 (1996); see
Fareed Zakaria, Take the Lead in Liberia, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 18, 2003, at 35 (explaining
that "neglecting [countries teetering on the edge of anarchy] will not produce world war
but might well produce failed states, regional instability, civil war, the spread of
disease and even safe havens for terror groups."). See generally BRUCE M. RUSSEIT &
JOHN R. ONEAL, TRIANGULATING PEACE (2001).
62.
Donoho, supra note 61, at 365.
63.
See Benton and Ware, supra note 3, at 858 (stating that this has been a
significant American concern for over 40 years).
64.
John-Thor Dahlburg, Haitians Held After Fleeing Ship, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 30,
2002, at 8.
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Coast Guard having intercepted hundreds during the course of the
65
anti-Aristide uprising.
In the international context, democracy is not merely a preferred
form of government; the right to live under democratic rule has been
deemed an international right.6 6 Logically, the necessity of "free and
fair" elections is similarly viewed. 67 Democracy has become "the
dominant political philosophy of the multilateral community. 68s This
consensus, as expressed in the 1993 Vienna Declaration on Human
Rights from the U.N. World Conference on Human Rights, suggests
that a state without democracy is a state in violation of its citizens'
human rights, and, subsequently, the international community has
the right to foster democratization in such states 69 by helping to
establish an electoral system representative of the will of the
people. 70 The Haitian Constitution states that one of its purposes is
to "implant democracy." 71 Haiti does not need help choosing
democracy. It needs help with the actual "implantation." The level of
importance the international community attaches to the success of
democracy justifies their lending struggling countries, such as Haiti,
aid in reaching this goal.
Much of Haiti's ruin is attributable to the thirty years of
dictatorship under the Duvaliers from 1957 to 1986.72 While the
overthrow of their tyranny stopped their dramatic damage, it is only
permeable and trustworthy democratic rule that can start to fix
things. As Irwin P. Stotzky has put it:
If Duvalierism impedes the creation of the rule of law, the weakness of
democratic institutions keeps Duvalierism alive. The Haitian 'problem'
is not merely political . . . Legitimacy of the state requires the
participation of Haiti's majority in deciding the fate of the country...
Haitian democracy will have to develop in the rural areas and the city
73
ghettos, or it will not be able to develop at all.

This statement correctly explains not only Haitians' need for
democracy but also the ways in which Haiti is inherently unfit for

65.
66.

Bill Frelick, Denying Haiti'sRefugees, WASH. POST, Mar. 6, 2004, at A19.
See generally Gregory H. Fox, The Right to Political Participation in

InternationalLaw, in DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (Gregory H.

Fox & Brad R. Roth eds., 2000).
67.
See Irving, supra note 59, at 47-48.
68.
Barnes, supra note 53, at 86.
69.
See Margaret Satterthwaite, Human Rights Monitoring, Elections
Monitoring, and Electoral Assistance as Preventive Measures, 30 N.Y.U. INT'L L. & POL.
709, 716 (1998) (quoting Thomas Buergenthal).
See DeFeis, supra note 60, at 321 (explaining that a democratic government
70.
must be based on "the will of the people as expressed through free, open, and fair
elections").
71.
HAITI CONST. pmbl.
72.
See Brian Concannon, Jr., Public InternationalLaw, Section V: Justice For
Haiti: the Raboteau Trial, 35 INT'L LAW 641, 641 (2001).
73.

See STOTZKY, SILENCING THE GUNS IN HAITI, supra note 38, at 26-27.
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such a transition. 74 A U.N. team monitoring Haitian elections in 1990
noted, in their first report, the absence of democratic traditions and
75
the prevalence of totalitarianism and violence in Haiti.
In this condition, Haiti challenges both the notion that
democracy can develop in recovering countries and the notion that
recovering countries can develop democracy. 76 The challenge is that
those things which allow democracy to function-multi-party
systems, freedoms of association and expression, protection of human
rights, a vital civil society, a free and competent press, widespread
participation, and free and fair elections-are the products of
democracy. 77 While the obstacles between Haiti and democratization
used to be tyranny, torture, and corruption, the current obstacles
come in the form of inexperience and incompetence in the machinery
of democracy. 7 8 The challenge of reinvigorating the democratizing
process is one for which Haiti needs the support of the international
community, primarily with implementing free and fair elections.
Democratization will have to be successful if Haiti is to emerge
from its current condition. Many who have studied this issue are
hesitant to believe Haiti's democratization could occur. 79 However,
optimism is an option; current developments suggest that several
strong forces work in favor of democracy in states recovering from
eras of conflict.8 0 Namely, the current prestige and legitimacy that
democracy enjoys and the familiarity of democratic principles (though
not its intricacies) allow these recovering states to build on a working
understanding of and confidence in the basic machinery of
democracy.8 1 Also, democracy is generally associated with economic
health, and such economic stability (or hope of it) only bolsters
existing democracy and popular support for it.8 2 This issue of
economic stability, though, can be a double-edged sword for a country
in as poor an economic condition as Haiti, for if democracy does not
result in economic prosperity, or at least reasonable improvement
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75.
Thomas M. Franck, Legitimacy and the Democratic Entitlement, in Fox &
Roth, supra note 66, at 36-37.
76.
See Stotzky, supra note 31, at 279 (asserting that Haiti represents to an
extreme degree the struggles faced by other former dictatorships striving toward
democracy).
77.
See Satterthwaite, supra note 69, at 711.
78.
See Stotzky, supra note 7, at 5 (explaining "the problems of an
inexperienced and incompetent democracy with people yearning to assume the
responsibilities of citizens").
79.
See Barnes, supra note 53, at 86.
80.
Id. at 87.
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from the status' quo, the system3 may lose the confidence of the people,
8
and hence, its own legitimacy.
If it is to succeed, Haiti may require a renewed commitment from
of
success
the
community to ensure
international
the
84
residual
fair
elections,
free
and
a
set
of
after
Even
democratization.
corruption, elitist control, and deadlock can degenerate into predemocratization hostilities.8 5 In the interest of lasting peace, the U.N.
and other international entities need to foster new democracies by
offering formal oversight to ensure the proper and effective
administration of new governments. 86 This may involve rather
specific segments of Haitian society and public administration being
buttressed by international support.8 7 While such involvement is
important to create enough stability for a new democracy to succeed,
buttressed success should not be confused with self-sufficiency, and
and
the Haitian government needs to be independently stable
88
operations.
those
of
control
complete
taking
before
confident
to
bring democracy
noted that "[t]o
It has been
be
must
stability
social
and
political
Haiti... [e]conomic,
assured... so that the less privileged classes, which make up over 90
percent of the Haitian people, can enjoy basic necessities that make
up dignified life. ''8 9 That stability, the argument goes, comes through
strengthening, stabilizing, constraining, and training the three
branches of the Haitian government to allow the rule of law and due
process to prosper. 90 The remainder of this note argues that for the
emergence of a strong and legitimate, yet limited, central
government, the stabilization, empowerment, and training of the
judicial branch in particular presents the most promising next step to
promote Haitian democratization.
After viewing Haiti's laundry list of serious and threatening
problems, one cannot help but wonder where to start. Despite diverse
ills concerning economics, education, law enforcement, and health
care, if the road to recovery is also the road to democracy, then free,
fair, and inclusive elections, the fundamental essential element of

83.
Id.
See Karl J. Irving, The United Nations and Democratic Intervention: Is
84.
"Swords into Ballot Boxes" Enough?, 25 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 41, 42 (1996) (stating
that "[q]uick to declare success and move on, the international community has, in the
process, virtually ignored problems of public administration").
Id. at 42-43.
85.
86.
Id at 43-44.
See id. at 51, 52 (explaining that, in other nations, support groups have
87.
aided in operations such as mail, schools, hospitals, animal control, interim judiciaries,
and training for lawyers, judges, and magistrates).
Id. at 52 (explaining that in Somalia, the transitional government was not
88.
provided with adequate implementation of election details, or power distribution, and
such led to disastrous conflict).
Stotzky, supranote 7, at 3.
89.
Id.
90.
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democracy, must be the starting point in Haiti. With the current state
of governmental instability and electoral confusion, it is Haiti's
judicial system-a broken but promising vessel-that, through
competent and empowered application of a reasoned body of
constitutional and electoral law, could serve as the most promising
agent of stability, order, and the rule of law.

IV. WHERE TO START: LEGITIMATE, FREE, AND FAIR ELECTIONS

A. Elections Are the Firstand Most Essential Step toward Haiti's
Democratization
Caribbean leaders at a December 2002 summit in Cuba convened
to address (among other things) Haitian electoral issues, and they
issued a joint statements saying, "[e]lections are the only means to a
legitimate government" in Haiti. 91 In 1993, Boutros Boutros-Ghali,
who was Secretary General of the United Nations at the time, stated
that "democratization cannot be separated

. . .

from the protection of

human rights. '92 Democratization is essential for Haiti on the most
basic level, and elections are an essential ingredient in that
transition.93 If democracy is the answer to interrupting and
redirecting Haiti's destructive trajectory, the nation must create a
system of legitimate, inclusive, informed elections. Such a success
could spur Haiti's government and its people toward the development
of other institutions critical to any liberal democratic society-the
rule of law, due process, effective law enforcement, and civil liberties,
94
to name only a few.
Some scholars and observers argue that the first step to
successful democratization is an economic one, not an electoral one.
The point can certainly be made that "capitalist growth is the single

best way to . . . create an effective and limited state" while "the

absence of free and fair elections should be viewed as one flaw, not
the definition of tyranny. Elections are an important virtue of
governance, but they are not the only virtue." 95 The necessity of free-

91.

Associated Press, Haiti a Step Closer to Legislative Vote, Caribbean Group

Says, MIAMI HERALD, Dec. 10, 2002, at 7A.
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World Conference on Human Rights, The Vienna Declaration and
Programme of Action (June, 1993), at 17.
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See DeFeis, supra note 60, at 321 (explaining that free elections which

carry the will of the people are the earmark of democratic rule).
94.
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95.
FAREED ZAKARIA, THE FUTURE OF FREEDOM: ILLIBERAL DEMOCRACY AT
HOME AND ABROAD 76, 156 (2003) (stating that without a moderately empowered and
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market economics and the stable and empowered electorate it creates
is a critical issue in any useful discussion about building democracy,
and the discussion about Haiti is no exception. 9 6 It is also true that
strategies for democratization "must be guided by a realistic
understanding of the politics of the transition. Naively
pressuring... states to hold instant elections can lead to disastrous
'9 7
results.
Such cautions are well-founded, but the establishment of free
and fair elections and the rule of law are particularly urgent
priorities in Haiti because of the country's particular and unique
history.98 While many democratizing countries must make a
transition from an era of stern authoritarian rule, Haiti is attempting
to make a transition from, above all, chaos. The recent collection of
questionably elected officials has only served as a symbolic
discouragement and a practical impediment to establishing the kind
of order and confidence in democracy that Haiti needs for economic
and every other kind of development. 99 The most recent coup has
again proved that, to many Haitians, violence is a more desirable and
effective route to change than peaceful political opposition. Haitian
history is also rife with examples of electoral failure. 10 0 Just
demonstrating that free and fair elections are possible is a
prerequisite to Haitian public confidence and participation in
democratization.
In order for democratic elections to be effectual in aiding Haiti's
progress, certain essential conditions must be fostered. Two such
conditions are sufficient contestation in elections and sufficient
inclusiveness in structuring the electorate. 11 If either the
opportunity for opposing views and representatives to compete for the
support of the electorate or the ability of the population to be a part of
the electorate are threatened or infringed, democracy as a whole will
cease to function.' 0 2 The Haitian Constitution guarantees a
democracy "which entails ideological pluralism and political
rotation,"'10 3 but contestation is a very real problem in Haiti because
many of the competing parties are so suspicious of Haitian elections
influential populous-a bourgeoisie-even elections can lead to more dictatorial,
illiberal regimes).
96.
The question of economic reform and development in Haiti is beyond the
scope of this Note, but it is not the author's position that the issue of economics is not of
the highest importance.
97.
JACK SNYDER, FROM VOTING TO VIOLENCE 16 (2000) (citing the tragedy in
Burundi as an example: after elections in 1993, ethnic strife led to upheaval and the
killing of thousands).
98.
See supra notes 2-58.
99.
See id.
100.
See infra notes 122-135 and accompanying text.
101.
Barnes, supra note 53, at 88-89.
102.
See id.
103.
HAITI CONST. pmbl.
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that they refuse to participate. 10 4 Meaningful voting and meaningful
democracy depend on "equal participation and rational discourse
among all segments of the populous." 10 5 It is at least a significant
benefit for the future of Haitian democracy that political parties
already exist.
Another consideration must be the ways in which Haitian
elections are organized in view of creating long-term equality of
representation and legitimacy.1 0 6 Having a proportional body elected
not merely by a nation-wide plurality or majority (akin to the U.S.
Congress) ensures that while citizens of a particular region may not
be a majority or plurality, they are nonetheless adequately
represented.10 7 That the Haitian Constitution calls for two
representative bodies similar to the two houses of the U.S. legislature
addresses this concern.10 8 Fair and equitable division of electoral
districts and the subsequent quality and accuracy of representation,
though, is of little value even when the constitution provides for it, if
the current reality does not.10 9
Practical problems aside, Haiti's 1987 Constitution envisions a
well-crafted, limited federal government and a system of
representative elections. These guarantees provide an adequate basis
for judicial enforcement. The country's territory is divided into (from
smallest to largest) Communal Sections, Commmunes, and
Departments (of which there are nine), each of which maintain
councils of elected representatives that see to issues of local provision
and local government. 110 The Haitian government, like the
government of the United States, is divided into three branches:
legislative, executive, and judicial.11 '
The national legislature is composed of two bodies: the House of
Deputies and the Senate. 112 Members of the House of Deputies
(numbered at least seventy) are elected by direct suffrage from
smaller municipal electoral districts for terms of four years, the whole
113
membership of the house being up for election every four years.
The Senate, also elected by direct suffrage, is elected at the
Department level, and each department is represented by three

104.
(AP), Nov.
105.
106.
107.

Michael Norton, Haiti Misses Deadline for Next Election, MIAMI HERALD
5, 2002, at 6A.
Stotzky, supra note 7, at 4.
See Barnes, supra note 53, at 95.
See id. at 95-96.
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senators. 114 Like U.S. senators, Haitian senators are elected to sixyear terms, and one-third of the seats are up for reelection every two
years. 115 Haiti's president, head of the executive branch, is elected to
a five-year term by a nation-wide majority vote. 1 16 Presidents cannot
serve in two consecutive terms, but can serve in two (but no more
117
than two) non-consecutive terms.
The legitimacy of elected officials depends upon the sufficient
participation of the electorate. Fair and full participation is only the
first hurdle though, because to truly participate in democracy in the
intended sense, the electorate must be sufficiently educated and
steady to make legitimate choices and ward off candidates who tend
toward demagoguery or tyranny. 118 A civil society strong enough to
defeat an oppressive regime does not always translate into a political
society strong enough to maintain legitimate democratic rule: such is
the danger in Haiti. 119 Democratic rule must involve an electorate
whose influence and support forces candidates to represent their
needs; a stronger education system and a competent and free press
can help achieve those ends. 120 James Madison wrote that in order for
democracy to succeed, two conditions must exist: a government
capable of governing, and an electorate capable of controlling the
government. 121 That is Haiti's predicament: while there must be a
starting point for progress, it is impossible truly to isolate any one
variable from other necessary girders of the democratic framework.
One goal-stability-is particularly essential, and the courts can
contribute greatly to the pursuit of it.
B. Recent Electoral Failure
In May 2000, under then-president Rene Preval of Aristide's
Lavalas party, Haiti held legislative elections that were tainted by
accusations of corruption, intimidation, and violence that destroyed
122
their legitimacy and incited passionate and long-lasting protest.
Despite the controversy, the scheduled presidential election was held
in November 2000, and Aristide, who under the Haitian Constitution
could only serve a second term after sitting out a term, ran for and
"won" reelection. 123 As in May, the election was questionably

114.
115.

Id. art. 94.
HAITI CONST. art. 95.

116.
Id. art. 134.
117.
Id.
118.
See DeFeis, supra note 60, at 321 (explaining that even free and fair
elections do not always result in democratic rule).
119.
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Id.
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Id. at 409.
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See Chapman, supra note 15.
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Id.
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officiated and furiously boycotted, and estimates suggested less than
ten percent participation by the eligible electorate. 124 Aristide took
office for his second term in February 2001, but the disputed
legislative elections in May 2000 and the presidential election in
November 2000 hurt his, and the entire government's, legitimacy and
stability, and the controversy spawned a multitude of negative
international responses. 125 For instance, the United States withheld
over $500 million in economic aid, and the OAS and United Nations.
became so incensed that they withdrew or threatened to withdraw a
significant amount of their support. 12 6 In June 2001, the OAS
General Assembly cited the strengthening of Haitian democracy in
the context of this electoral failure as one of the most pressing issues
in the western hemisphere. 127 Though Aristide survived for a few
years, furor over these failed elections was one of the driving forces
behind the coup that toppled him on the last day of February 2004.128
This electoral crisis is not Haiti's first. 129 The coup-era elections
of 1993 were essentially shams because they were regularly boycotted
by all but the ruling party. 130 Even after "democracy" was restored to
Haiti, the problems persisted. In June 1995, Haiti held elections for
all positions below the president, but administrative problems and
other objections required three rounds of voting to reach the eventual
outcome.' 3 ' Even then, most of the parties other than Aristide's
Lavalas party refused to participate in the second and third rounds in
l3 2
protest to the irregularities at the polls.
In November 2002, a student demonstration in protest to the
current electoral debacle was purposely organized on the fifteenth
anniversary of another tragic election. 133 That election, in 1987, was
Haiti's first in the post-Duvalier era: the election was interrupted

124.
Id.
125.
See Haitian Opposition Vows New Protests to Force Aristide to Resign, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 28, 2002, at A14 ("Mr. Aristide has been hamstrung since he took office in
February 2001.").
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The Americas, FrustrationBoils Over, supra note 28, at 50 ("America and
others have conditioned resumption of aid dollars on resolution of objections to the May
2000 elections.").
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Dispatch, Inc., June 5, 2002, available at 2002 WL 25969162 (last visited Feb. 12,
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when citizens waiting to cast their votes at a high school were
attacked with firearms and machetes by army and paramilitary
objectors. 134 In the end, fifteen voters were killed while waiting in
line, and the elections were suspended. 135 The history of resistance to
electoral consistency in Haiti is very real and very troubling. Because
of this history, Haitians need to see proper elections work in their
country in order to believe that they can happen.
C. Important and Unfinished Business
The most pressing question for Haiti right is how to install a
legitimately elected government. The coup has not solved the
problems created by the 2000 elections and has added to the number
of vacant high-level offices. Aristide is gone now, but the largely
vacant legislature remains as do doubts about the possibility of fair
elections.
The flawed elections of 2000 spawned constant protest, held up
more than $500 million dollars in international aid, and contributed
to a coup. 136 The OAS had set many deadlines for the Haitian
government to make progress toward remedying the electoral
stalemate, but Haitian officials never responded to those
challenges.' 3 7 The U.S. Embassy in Port-au-Prince had said that
parliamentary elections to validate the 2000 elections were Haiti's
only solution. 138 The Bush Administration has had harsh words
regarding the Haitian refusal to address the flawed elections: "Haiti
is turning into a non-country."'1 39 While Aristide insisted repeatedly
that he intended to hold elections in the first half of 2003, he never
did, and the OAS said that the Haitian government did not do enough
to convince opponents to participate in the new elections, 140 a
criticism those opposing groups made as well citing inadequacies in
security and freedom of speech.' 4 1 Aristide said in November 2002
that, "[t]he best resolution to this crisis is to form an electoral council
and hold new elections."'1 42 He was right, but it never happened.
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Much of the opposition had refused to participate in new elections
unless Aristide resigned. 14 3 Now that Aristide is gone, Haiti must
find a way to engage those opposing groups and create an electoral
system that will lend credibility to those it puts in power.
As pressing as the current crisis is, the real problem is a
systemic one requiring a comprehensive systemic solution and not
something that can be solved with a one-time fix. That solution can
come most effectively and most legitimately from enforcement and
application of Haiti's existing constitutional provisions concerning
proper elections and the protection of democratic liberties. 144 In short,
Haiti needs the rule of law. The entity that can most effectively and
most legitimately interpret and apply the constitutional and electoral
law of the country, the judicial branch, is Haiti's most promising
source of strong, domestically oriented progress toward free and fair
elections and, ultimately, successful democratization.

V. HAITI'S MOST PROMISING TOOL: THE JUSTICE SYSTEM AND ITS ROLE
IN CREATING AND ENSURING PROPER ELECTIONS WITHIN HAITI'S
CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK

A. How the HaitianJustice System Can Serve as a Cornerstonefor
Electoral Stability
With help, Haiti's judicial system could be the catalyst to real
democratic transition in Haiti. Through the administration of justice,
Haiti could further four important developments necessary for
successful Haitian elections: encouraging opposing participation,
deterring corruption, creating public confidence, and fostering
democratic liberties.
The legitimacy of Haiti's president and of Haiti's legislature
145
depends on the legitimacy of the elections that put them in office.
While restoration of those offices is the ultimate goal, there is only
one branch of government whose legitimacy does not depend on
adequate elections: the judicial branch. 14 6 Thus, it is the lone
institution that the people of Haiti may "lean on" without suspicion
that electoral corruption put it there. The unelected Haitian
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HAITI CONST. arts. 24, 28, 31, 88, 89, 94, 95.
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147
judiciary, which is not ultimately accountable to the electorate,
through promoting electoral and constitutional justice in Haiti, could
serve to empower the electorate and ensure a system in which the
Haitians have confidence in their power over the institutions that
govern them. According to Christopher Eisgruber:

A good way to guard against minority rule is to make sure that all
public officials owe their offices, directly or indirectly, to a fair vote of
the entire electorate. That is one reason why free elections are
indispensable to democracy. But it does not follow that the best
institutions to represent the people will always be the one that is the
14 8
most thoroughly majoritarian.

In Haiti, the best institution to represent the people is the one that
stands for order in the face of chaos: the courts.
The fact that the Chief Justice of Haiti's highest court, Boniface
Alexandre, is serving as the interim President could do further
149
damage to public perception of the Haitian judiciary's impartiality.
Hopefully, Alexandre will be a stabilizing presence, but judges and
courts should avoid being associated too closely with the often
wayward and corrupt executive branch. If the courts are to be a stern
and fair authority competent to establish the rule of law, the Haitian
people cannot suspect that the judicial branch is worthy of the same
suspicion and distrust as the other branches of the central
government. Alexandre's performance while holding office could go a
long way in promoting or damaging the stature of the judicial system.
1. Encouraging Participation
A large part of the quandary of the current electoral standoff is
would-be
many
electoral boycotts by
the suspicion-filled
participants. 150 Because of corruption and lawlessness in past
elections, potential candidates and parties are hesitant to participate
in future elections. Not only do they fear another unfair election, but
they also fear being left with no judicious way to remedy such an
unjust election and the bogus authority such an election confers on
the winner. If opponents knew not only that elections would be well
monitored, but also that those who sought to corrupt the process
could be effectively prosecuted, it would encourage confidence and
participation. Opponents would be able to believe that they would
have a fair chance of winning and that such a system would provide

147.
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148.
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in legal action an effectual remedy to rigged elections as opposed to
the remedy many would-be opponents currently use: to not
participate at all. For now, the only effective grievance against a
disputed election is to boycott the next one. 151 Being able to challenge
the results of a previous election and participate in the next election
would be preferred by the potential participants and beneficial to the
system.
2. Deterring Corruption
This second point, deterring corruption, builds largely off of the
first but is more directly related to the actions of incumbents or
would-be corrupt candidates and parties. Just as with any criminal or
civil penalty, the prospect of potent and forceful oversight and review
of election practices and procedures, in both the civil and criminal
contexts, would deter individuals, parties, and officials from meddling
152
illegally in the electoral process.
3. Creating Public Confidence
Vital to a democracy's legitimacy is the public's confidence in the
system and the government it provides. In Haiti today, such
confidence is impossible because the regular elections called for by
the constitution are not held. 15 3 Each time, controversy swirls around
the elections, and often they are boycotted or sometimes not held at
all.15 4 When elections are held at irregular intervals, the public
cannot help but be quite suspicious of just how democratic their
government is. Citizens become hesitant to vote, hesitant to
participate, and hesitant to put their hopes or their efforts into
political action. For a growing democracy in need of popular support,
confidence, and participation, the appearance of dictatorship and
corruption is almost as destructive as the real thing.
Evans Paul, a former mayor of Port-au-Prince, Haiti's capital
city, leads an opposing political party and recently characterized his
cause as preventing "the establishment of an Aristide dictatorship in

151.
See id. (stating that the boycotts of these opposition parties demonstrate
the inadequacy of procedures of redress after an election, because even though they
would prefer the existing regime to be replaced, the opposition resists taking part in
elections).
152.
It is evident that this is a necessary and justified purpose for reform. See
Chapman, supra note 24 (explaining that chief among the allegations concerning the
failed 2000 elections are claims that incumbents and election officials rigged the
elections).
153.
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Haiti."'1 55 With goals so basic as these at the political forefront, many
Haitians do not trust the democratic accountability created by today's
electoral process and are forced to fight, rather than trust, elected
officials.' 5 6 Such an attitude in the electorate can lead to hesitancy or
apathy when it comes time to vote. Yet by the most basic democratic
principles, participation by the electorate is essential. In fact, the
Haitian Constitution lists "to vote in elections without constraint" not
57
just as a right, but as every citizen's civic obligation.'
4. Fostering Democratic Liberties
While elections are the most basic and most vital component of a
democratic society, the democratic environment is about much more
than just elections. Democratic liberties are both the product of
democracy and the means by which democracy operates. The more
the Haitian courts can do to enforce and give substance to Haiti's
constitutional liberties, the more the byproducts of those liberties will
fertilize the quality of social discourse and representation in Haitian
elections. 158 The Haitian Constitution explicitly protects individual
liberty, 159 freedom of expression, 160 freedom of conscience, 161 and
62
freedoms of assembly and association.'
The guarantee of such freedoms is often not honored in today's
Haiti. For example, in reference to freedom of speech, actual
protection of what media remains in Haiti is bleak. 16 3 Louis Joinet, a
French lawyer who served as an official U.N. observer, said in
October 2002, "tomorrow the critical journalist will have no other
choice in Haiti but self-censure, exile or death .. .the press, and
generally the freedom of opinion and of expression, are the targets of
persecution." 164 Only if the Haitian justice system adequately
protects fundamental liberties by prosecuting the persecutors and
interpreting the constitution so as to protect the rights of citizens can
a truly democratic climate settle on Haitian dialogue and elections.
Such a democratic climate is both a cause and effect of free and fair
elections.
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B. The Raboteau Trial: Proofof JudicialCompetence?
On November 9, 2000, a Haitian court reached verdict in the sixweek Raboteau trial convicting sixteen of the twenty-two defendants
in custody in addition to multiple defendants tried in absentia. 165 The
trial was not only significant in size and complexity but also in
gravity. 166 The Raboteau massacre was a serious crime and a serious
failure of the rule of law in Haiti, but its importance was exaggerated
because the massacre had become a symbol for all the human rights
167
violations that took place under the military coup leadership.
Raboteau, a small fishing village in Haiti, was the scene of a
horrific massacre in late April 1994.168 The military dictatorship
following the 1991 coup which ousted President Aristide sought to
silence revolutionary action, and Raboteau was a village known for a
grassroots movement advocating the return of President Aristide and
the return of democracy to Haiti. 169 On the dawn of April 22, military
and paramilitary troops carried out a planned attack on the
170
shantytown, breaking into homes and ambushing escape routes.
While the exact death toll was unknown because the troops did not
allow relatives to have access to the bodies and some were tossed into
the sea, at least a dozen were killed and many others were wounded,
171
tortured, imprisoned, and beaten.
The trial was remarkable given the state and reputation of
Haiti's judicial system. The justice system left over from the Duvalier
era had neither the capacity or the desire to handle matters involving
the complex or the controversial. 1 72 According to observers and
commentators, the trial was fair to both sides, well-orchestrated,
well-organized, and subsequently well-received by national and
international onlookers. 173 The U.N. Human Rights Commission's
Independent Expert on Haiti, Adam Dieng, said that the Raboteau
trial was "a huge step forward" for the Haitian justice system that
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proved it was capable of effectively prosecuting human rights cases,
174
often the hardest kind of cases.
As encouraging as the Raboteau trial has been, it has also
proven to be but one working cog in a still broken wheel. Mario
Joseph, a prosecutor in the case, said after the verdict, "I'm very

satisfied because 22 people were tried and of those 16 were found
75
guilty, and of those, 12 will stay in jail for the rest of their life.'

Yet, on August 3, 2002, a massive jailbreak in Gonaives freed 159
prisoners including some of the most notable convicts from the
Raboteau trial.176 Such events demonstrate that all the arms of the
government need to be in working order for the rule of law to actually
exist: fair prosecutions without secure jails, or secure jails without
fair prosecutions, fail to bring Haiti significantly closer to the stable
rule of law. The Haitian government has been prone to counteract the
rule of law in many other ways, including condoning vigilante justice,
failing to prosecute many crimes, and allowing (and participating in)
threatening treatment to those who speak in opposition to the current
177
leadership.
The jailbreak in Gonaives serves as a metaphor for the problems
facing Haitian democracy. Perhaps a stronger metaphor is the fact
that on the day the Gonaives jail was leveled, the courthouse was also
burned to the ground. 178 The law is under attack. Much as a good
prosecution seems useless without a good jail, elections can seem
useless when there is no educated electorate, and the rule of law can
seem irrelevant when there is little food or healthcare. 179 That said,
there is certainly no solution without some effort, and the Raboteau
trial is an example of the progress
that can be made by starting with
80
the courts and the rule of law.'
C. The Recent JudicialRebuilding Lessons in Kosovo and East Timor

As daunting as the task of building a comprehensive and
competent judiciary may be in Haiti, there are examples of the
174.
U.N. Press Release, Raboteau Verdict in Haiti a Landmark in Fight
Against Impunity; But Case Not Yet Finished Says UN Independent Expert (Nov. 20,
2000), available at http://www.unog.ch/news2/documents/newsenthrOO090e.html (last
visited Feb. 12, 2004).
175.
Trenton Daniel, Military Officers Convicted in Landmark Trial in Haiti, at
http:llwww.africana.com/DailyArticles/index_20001128.htm.
176.
Mass
Jailbreak Empties
Haiti Prison, Aug.
3,
2002,
at
http://www.news.ninmsn.com/World/story-36678.asp.
177.
Human Rights Watch, Human Rights Watch World Report 2002: Haiti, at
http://www.hrw.org/wr2k2/americas7.html.
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UN Expert Alarmed by Impunity Granted Armed Militias in Haiti, supra
note 67.
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See id.; see also Stotzky, supra note 31, at 283 (explaining Haiti's health
woes).
180.
See Concannon, supranote 72, at 641; UN Press Release, supra note 183.
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efficacy of well-employed efforts to do just that in other contexts. In
late 1999, the United Nations established temporary governments in
Kosovo and East Timor, and the new governments were charged with
the task not only of rebuilding the judiciary virtually from scratch,
but also of rebuilding almost the entire public sector, everything from
healthcare to education, airports to utilities. 8 1 Needing to establish a
legal framework in which to carry out all of these tasks as well as to
deal with criminal activity and other immediate legal problems, there
were plenty of issues to address. 8 2 Specifically problematic for the
judicial reconstruction was that most courthouses had been burned,
and records, supplies, and other resources were not available; most
crucial, though, was the desperate shortage of adequately trained
judges and lawyers.18 3 Throughout the process, the United Nations
kept local ownership of the new judiciary a top priority. When not
enough domestic judges for the entire region could be located, the
choice was made to have those judges travel rather than employ
international, non-local individuals.' 8 4 Training those individuals
was not a simple task either. While technical training was a large
part of the work, the United Nations also prioritized the "crucial role
of the judiciary in society and the benefits of a culture of law. ' 18 5
The efforts of the temporary governments in East Timor and
Kosovo to reestablish judicial order, appoint lawyers and judges,
recreate a correctional system, and devise and implement a body of
applicable law have been fairly successful.' 8 6 This shows that
rebuilding a judicial framework amid daunting circumstances is
possible, and it is an encouraging development for the situation in
Haiti. While Haiti's troubles are different than those in East Timor
and Kosovo, East Timor and Kosovo serve as good proxies for what
Haiti faces in rebuilding and legitimizing its own judiciary. Haiti is
not in the state of absolute destruction that East Timor and Kosovo
were. Haiti has a constitution, elected officials, and, though limited,
some history of judicial effectiveness to lean on.187 In large part, that
makes Haiti's judicial rebuilding a less desperate task, yet in some
ways it will be even more difficult. Haiti has to overcome a pervasive
cultural trend of lawlessness and corruption. Haiti also has to deal
with some forces that resist the stabilization that democracy will

181.
Hansjorg Strohmeyer, Collapse and Reconstruction of a Judicial System:
The United Nations Missions in Kosovo and East Timor, 95 AM. J. INT'L. L. 46, 47
(2001).
182.
Id. at 50.
183.
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Id. at 54.
185.
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Id. at 60.
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See discussion supra notes 181-85.
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bring. While international sympathy was a significant force in favor
of supplying aid to East Timor and Kosovo, that sympathy in Haiti's
case has turned largely into international frustration; Haiti has had
so many chances and has failed so many times.' 8 8
Regardless of the differences, some issues are identical. Chief
among them is the fact that rebuilding any society requires a stable
judicial structure and requires that international aid be given in a
manner that allows for domestic ownership and ultimate control over
the judicial system. East Timor and Kosovo do not demonstrate that
the task iseasy, but they do demonstrate that with the right
principles, significant progress is a realistic goal.
D. The Role of the InternationalCommunity
Haitians have to learn how effectively to monitor legitimate
elections, and the courts have to get the support and training to
continue their progress. If history is to provide the example, those
solutions will not come primarily from within Haiti; it has not thus
far. It must come-in some form-from the international community.
Haiti recognizes this, as it was the first independent national
government to request U.N. oversight of elections solely to validate
their legitimacy. 18 9
An effective answer could come from adopting some of the
strategies discussed by the International Criminal Court (ICC). The
ICC, while offering a forum for international trials (typically for cases
concerning human right violations), recognizes the desirability of
national trials as opposed to international ones. 190 Not only do
national trials contribute to the feeling of domestic legitimacy in the
eventual result of the case, but important cases also put a spotlight
on the nation's justice system and force it to operate at its highest
levels when the world's eyes are watching. 191 In order for developing
nations realistically to administer their own national trials, they have
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189.
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Criminal Court, art. 7, July 17, 1998, U.N. Doc. 32/AICONF. 183/9, 37 I.L.M 999, 1004
(1998).
191.
See Concannon, supra note 12, at 229 (describing domestic human rights
trials as serving as both "a carrot and a stick" in that they improve the result in the
particular case at hand, but also improve the domestic judicial infrastructure); see

Gennady M. Danilenko, The Statute of the International Criminal Court and Third
States, 21 MICH. J. INT'L L. 445, 475 (2000) (explaining that the ICC seeks to
complement and strengthen rather than replace domestic courts, stepping in only when
domestic courts are unable or unwilling to address a matter).
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to have sufficient numbers of legally trained personnel. The ICC
actively recruits lawyers and prosecutors to train them, but it has
been proposed that the ICC should recruit lawyers from countries in
need of judicial training, have them work and train with the ICC, and
then return to their home country to help administer justice
192
domestically with the training gained in the international context.
The goal of the initiative would be to use international prosecution to
create domestic competency to deal with even large-scale trials at
home, and thus "narrow the gap" between domestic and international
prosecution and adjudication. 193
....
Ironically, by providing an international stage for human rights
prosecution, the ICC attempts to make its own existence less
necessary in the process. Any aid strategy in Haiti must have the
same goal. While the ICC is not designed to get involved in election
issues, the strategies which it explores to mature the legal
infrastructure of developing countries could be very beneficial in the
area of election monitoring and enforcement. Any actual
interpretation and enforcement of constitutional or electoral law must
come from the Haitian courts, because elections-more than criminal
prosecutions and more than virtually any other issue-depend on
domestic approval for legitimacy. That said, the U.N. or the OAS,
which are already deeply involved in election monitoring in
developing countries, should employ the service of election and
judicial officials from countries in need of such expertise like Haiti.
Such a program could increase the effectiveness of elections in
developing democracies and thus increase the effectiveness of the
democracies themselves. Powerful, successful democracies with an
expressed interest in spreading democracy could help themselves by
training election and legal officials. For instance, if the United States
helped Haiti with legitimate elections and democratization, such aid
would help create a government that U.S. policies suggest would
194
require less help and oversight by the U.S.
Under such "teach-a-man-to-fish" logic, treating the human
rights, poverty, environmental, and economic issues in Haiti may be
necessary, but it is a temporary solution and not something capable of
dealing with the country's "hunger". Creating a legitimate democracy

192.
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193.
Id. at 232.
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State Dep't Press Releases & Documents, State Department Official
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would do so. The fear of subsequent Haitian dependence would not be
a controlling one in this case: a stable democracy is one that depends
on international aid less - not more. Haiti itself illustrates the point.
Haiti is anything but stable, yet it has received more than $300
million from the United States alone in the last four years and now
requires U.S. Marines to calm the streets. 195 International help with
elections, in that they would lead to a more independent Haiti, would
1
serve the same temporary purpose as the ICC. 96
Haiti needs to utilize the aid of the international community to
implement sufficient democratic rule, but the Haiti of tomorrow needs
to be one that is self-sufficient and self-directing. Maintaining this
balance is difficult as it requires "reconciling the demands of rapidly
evolving principles of substantive international law, such as selfdetermination, democratic governance and the promotion of human
rights, with states' almost atavistic impulses to preserve their
sovereign prerogatives. '197 Unless the legitimacy and necessity of
stable, constitutional rule is internalized by the Haitian people,
democracy can only be applied to, not flow from, their society and
198
voters.
There is no question that Haitian judges need training and,
apparently, it can be done effectively. Certainly it is no coincidence
that the judge who presided over the Raboteau trial graduated at the
top of his class from Haiti's Ecole de la Magistrature, a training
academy for Haiti's judges and prosecutors. 199 But it will take much
more than one courtroom of well-trained lawyers and judges to give
Haiti even a moderately sufficient legal infrastructure. 200 The goal for
the justice system in Haiti should be to build courts not merely
competent to deal with massive controversy and complexity, but also
to build a comprehensive, stable judicial structure as a component
and catalyst of a more trustworthy and consistent governmental
structure. This will help ease the country's unrest and create a stable
system in which crime is punished, the constitution is enforced,
elections are legitimate, and the rule of law is respected. The courts
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certainly can not create that situation alone, but they can be a driving
force.
It is similarly important that the Haitian police and security
forces be trained in more effective, and perhaps less aggressive,
tactics to keep the peace. Such attempts have not always been
accepted by the Haitians, however, as in the fall of 1993 when the
U.S.S. Harlan County, filled with U.S. soldiers and engineers coming
to train the Haitians and help rebuild their infrastructure, arrived at
the docks in Port au Prince. 20 1 A mob stormed the dock and
prohibited the ship's entry, and a day later, it turned around.20 2 Haiti
must be willing to accept help, and that help must be offered in a way
that encourages Haitian acceptance. As contradictory as selfsufficiency and dependence on other countries may seem on the front
end, it is hard to imagine that Haiti will become more democratic and
more self-sufficient without accepting some foreign assistance. 20 3 A
U.S. State Department official explained the relationship between
international aid and Haiti's own responsibilities, saying that while
international support and funding is important "so too is the exercise
of effective
leadership
and political will by the Haitian
' 204
government.
U.N. Security General Kofi Annan summed up the situation
well: "It's going to take time, it's going to take lots of hard work, and
we should not expect to do a Band-Aid job for two years or so and
then turn around and leave, only to have to return. ' 20 5 Annan aptly
described the process of supporting democratization in Haiti as a
20° 6
"long haul.
E. A Note of Caution
While Haiti's struggles and obstacles create an undeniable need
for international support, the world must resist taking an overly
paternalistic or disrespectful approach to Haiti's governmental
evolution, something some feel has already happened. 20 7 It must be
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See Kurzban, supra note 55, at 410 ("The Haitian government should be
treated with the dignity and respect that any democratically elected government
deserves .. . [W]e need to find constructive ways to help the [Haitian] government on
its own term, not ours."). Interestingly, since Aristide's ouster, Kurzban-Aristide's
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remembered that Haiti's democracy has only been in continuous
20 8
existence since 1994, and democracy takes time to fully develop.
Even Aristide admitted recently, "[w]e are in the process of learning
'20 9
democracy in Haiti.
Those that warn of such a problem of paternalism warn of a
relevant danger. If what is in the world's interest and the Haitians'
interest is a truly independent Haiti, 210 then the Haitian government
and the Haitian Constitution must be the ultimate authorities in
their own land. However, Haiti should not be left to make all the
mistakes and -learn all the lessons on its own time and its own dime.
The most important way these concerns should affect the world's
policy toward democratization in Haiti is to give technical assistance,
academic training, and improved and necessary resources, but allow
Haiti to ultimately determine its own course, the substance of its own
policies, and the contours of its own constitution in a system that
reflects the will of the people. 21 1 This approach is especially necessary
with respect to the judiciary. The key is for the court to develop a
uniquely and genuinely Haitian body of law which has its roots and
authority in its own constitutional system. But in order for that to
happen, training, infrastructure, and national aid must stabilize
things for long enough and give the system the tools to build what
they need.

VI. CONCLUSION

There is no doubt that Haiti is a country in need of help. The key
is to give Haiti the kind of help that ultimately leads not to
dependence, but to independence. The recent departure of President
Aristide presents both distinct challenges and specific opportunities
for the progress of Haitian elections. Establishing a true and lasting
democracy in Haiti is the way to establishing truly independent
Haiti. Through empowering and supporting the Haitian judicial
system, the democratization process and the promotion of free and
fair elections can be initially built from Haiti's most promising and
most protecting arm of the domestic government. While the goal of
lawyer-has advocated restoring Aristide to the presidency. Peter Slevin,
U.S. Assembles Peacekeeping Coalition in Haiti;Aristide Says American Troops Ousted
Him Against His Will, WASH. POST, Mar. 2, 2004, at A12.
208.
Id. at 408.
209.
Marika Lynch, U.S. Team Pessimistic After Haiti Visit, MIAMI HERALD,
Jan. 27, 2003, at 5A.
210.
Donoho, supra note 61, at 364-65.
211.
See Kurzban, supra note 207, at 410. While Kurzban is perhaps more
adamant about how much deference and autonomy Haitian government should have in
its own democratization, he agrees that aid in the form of technical expertise and
needed resources are more appropriate than developing policy or cultivating opposition
parties to challenge Lavalas at the ballot box. See id.
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effective democratization through legitimate elections in Haiti must
be pursued with long-term optimism, there must be some basic
stabilization in order for any progress to be possible. A recent
declaration by a multitude of Haitian civil service organizations

declared that for "any credible and democratic electoral process in
Haiti" to take place, certain conditions must be met, such as a
legitimate freedom of assembly, the dismantling of corrupt and
powerful gangs, the release of political prisoners, and the assured
safety of journalists. 2 12 Through judicial assurance of these freedoms
and the commitment and ability to assure reasonable interpretation
and enforcement of electoral and constitutional -law, the Haitian
courts can provide a meaningful step down the road to truly
independent democratization. Haitians crave the rule of law and
legitimized leaders, and the courts can help to produce both of those
things.
In 1856, Abraham Lincoln said of the United States that "the
ballot [was] stronger than the bullet. '2 13 The task for the Haitian
judiciary and the Haitian government at large is to work to make the
same statement true in Haiti.
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